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The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach:
Reflections on the Sylvania Decision
RichardA. Posnert
In the absence of antitrust prohibitions, manufacturers commonly restrict competition among their distributors or dealers.
They may forbid the dealer to sell from any location other than that
designated in the dealership agreement ("location clause"), set
maximum or minimum resale prices, assign exclusive territories to
dealers, reserve certain customers to the manufacturer, forbid distributors to sell to other than authorized dealers, or forbid dealers
to sell to other dealers. One restriction on competition among dealers, resale price maintenance (placing a floor under the dealer's
resale price), was held to be illegal per se under section 1 of the
Sherman Act as early as 1911, in the Dr. Miles case.' But the legality
of nonprice restrictions in distribution was not even considered by
the Supreme Court until it decided the White Motor case in 1963.2
The Court in White Motor reversed a summary judgment entered
in favor of the government, holding that it was premature to deem
the particular restrictions involved (exclusive dealer territories and
reservation of certain customers to the manufacturer) illegal per se.
Four years later, the Court in Schwinn3 held that such restrictions
were indeed illegal per se when imposed in contracts of sale. On the
other hand, if the dealership agreement created an agency relationt Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This article is adapted from a talk given
on November 2, 1977, to an Antitrust Law Briefing Conference sponsored by the Federal Bar
Association. Robert H. Bork and Kenneth W. Dam commented helpfully on a previous draft.
I Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
2 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
3 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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ship between dealer and manufacturer, a nonprice restriction on
competition among dealers was not illegal per se. Last term, ten
years after Schwinn, the Court in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc.' repudiated Schwinn and held that nonprice restrictions on dealer competition are not illegal per se even if imposed in
a sales contract.
The Sylvania decision has generated considerable excitement
in the antitrust defense bar. The Court seemed to go out of its way
to overrule Schwinn: it could, as urged by Justice White in his
concurring opinion, have adopted the distinction whereby the lower
court upheld the legality of Sylvania's location clause without questioning Schwinn.5 Furthermore, the Court's opinion places unusual
emphasis on the role of economics in deciding antitrust cases, including "Chicago" economics, which is hostile to many of the traditional rules of antitrust liability.
My interest in Sylvania is based not only on the fact that it is
one of the most discussed antitrust decisions of recent years. I
briefed and argued the Schwinn case for the government. Subsequently, my views on the proper treatment of restrictions in distribution under the antitrust laws took a 180-degree turn, and the
article expressing my new thinking was heavily cited by the majority in Sylvania.'

I.

FROM

Schwinn TO Sylvania

To understand the possible significance of Sylvania for the development of antitrust doctrine, it is necessary to go back to the
government's brief in Schwinn.7 The brief did not argue that restricting competition among one's distributors was illegal per se. It
argued that the adverse effect of such a restriction on competition
97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
The Ninth Circuit and Mr. Justice White thought Schwinn distinguishable for two
reasons. First, Sylvania's action did not restrict intrabrand competition as severely because
Sylvania, unlike Schwinn, did not limit the territories where or the customers to whom its
dealers could sell. Second, Sylvania's market share was much smaller than Schwinn's at the
time they adopted their respective restricted distribution systems and so the restraints imposed by Sylvania had more potential for increasing interbrand competition. See 97 S. Ct.
2563 (White, J., concurring); 537 F.2d 980, 988-92 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc), afl'd on other
grounds, 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
6 Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282
(1975); see 97 S. Ct. at 2557 n.13, 2559 nn.18-21 & 2561. See also 97 S. Ct. at 2568 n.10. (White,
J., concurring). A revised version of the relevant portions of that article appears in R. POSNER,
ANTrrRuST LAW: AN EcoNomc PERSPECTVE 147-66 (1976).
Brief for the United States, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967).
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at the dealer level created a presumption of illegality that could be
rebutted, in principle at least, by showing that the restriction had
an offsetting procompetitive effect in enabling the manufacturer to
market his product more effectively in competition with other manufacturers. The government brief was profoundly skeptical, however, that this showing could ever be made except possibly by a
small and struggling new entrant. Indeed, the government thought
that restrictions on competition in distribution imposed by an established manufacturer were likely to reduce competition at the
manufacturing level as well as at the dealer level. Specifically, the
brief suggested that Schwinn had sought to restrict the distribution
of its bicycles in order to reinforce an image of superior quality that
would reduce the substitutability of other bicycle brands and thus
increase Schwinn's monopoly power in the bicycle market.
This analysis reflected the then prevailing thinking of the economics profession on restricted distribution. The Supreme Court,
to its credit, was not convinced, but neither was it persuaded that
restricted distribution was sufficiently innocuous (or beneficial) to
justify rejection of the per se approach. The Court, in an opinion by
Justice Fortas, adopted an arbitrary compromise. It held that restrictions on distribution were illegal per se when imposed in sales
contracts but not when imposed in agency contracts, even though
it had recently held, in Simpson v. Union Oil Company, that resale
price maintenance in an agency contract was illegal per se. s
Simpson precluded the Court in Schwinn from simply deeming restrictions in distribution outside the reach of section 1 of the Sherman Act when accomplished through agency contracts. So, to distinguish Simpson, the Court observed that the "net effect" of
Schwinn's restrictive consignment agreements was "to preserve and
not to damage competition in the bicycle market."9 But this statement undermined the Court's blanket condemnation of the identical restrictions when imposed in contracts of sale.
The lower federal courts were plainly unhappy with the per se
rule of Schwinn and exercised their ingenuity to find exceptions to
the rule.' 0 Meanwhile, academic opinion was changing. Lester Telser's pioneering article on resale price maintenance," though pub377 U.S. 13 (1964).
388 U.S. at 382.
,a The cases are collected in note 14 of the Court's opinion in Sylvania, 97 S. Ct. at 2557.
For an exhaustive analysis of the evolution of restricted distribution law to the eve of
Sylvania, see ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 2, VERcCAL REsTRICmIONs LIMITING
INTMBRAND CoMPanTaN (1977).
1 Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade? 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 86 (1960).
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lished well before the Schwinn case was decided, began winning
more adherents among academic economists and lawyers. Telser
had argued that manufacturers impose minimum resale prices on
their dealers not in order to give the latter monopoly profits, which
would be an absurd motivation for a manufacturer, but to induce
them to provide the optimal level of presale services.12 Dealers would
compete with each other in offering successively greater services
until their marginal cost curve rose to intersect the price fixed by
the manufacturer. Therefore, the manufacturer could, simply by
altering that price, automatically vary the level of dealer presale
services provided. This analysis can easily be extended to nonprice
restrictions.13 The manufacturer gives the dealer an exclusive territory so that the dealer can charge a price that will support the level
of services desired by the manufacturer. The dealer will provide that
level of services rather than pocket the difference between a high
price and the cost of distribution with little service because, if he
does not, the manufacturer will reassign the territory to another
dealer.
One reason why Telser's analysis was not more influential at
the time Schwinn was decided is that many economists viewed the
presale services encouraged by resale price maintenance and cognate nonprice restrictions as of dubious value to consumers, 4 a view
reflected in the government's brief in Schwinn. These services were
thought to be forms of advertising, and economists in this period
regarded advertising as a socially wasteful activity that served only
to reduce the elasticity of demand for advertised products. In particular, it was thought that heavy advertising convinced the consuming public, without any basis in real differences among brands of the
same product, that less heavily advertised brands were not good
substitutes for more heavily advertised ones. Acceptance of this
view of advertising has receded in recent years. Economists are more
likely now to regard advertising as a source of genuine consumer
information, sometimes irrespective of its content. 5 In addition,
studies have shown that heavy advertising is associated with unsta11He also argued that in some cases manufacturers might adopt resale price maintenance in order to shore up a manufacturers' cartel. This possibility is discussed in text and
notes at notes 21-22 infra.
13As demonstrated in Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
and Market Division, (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966).
'4 For a representative specimen of this thinking, see Comanor, Vertical Territorialand
Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1429-30
(1968).
" See, e.g., Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970).
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ble consumer brand preferences-intensive advertising does not
cement consumer loyalty to the advertised brand but, on the contrary, is the recourse of sellers who have difficulty holding on to their
customers.' 6 It is a weapon of competition rather than of monopoly.
Not all economists and lawyers knowledgeable in economics
who write on monopoly questions, perhaps not even most, view restricted distribution so benignly. Nevertheless, the profession now
views restricted distribution more favorably than it did when
Schwinn was decided. Justice Fortas's skepticism concerning the
government's economic arguments in Schwinn has been, tentatively
at least, vindicated.
I.

THE SCOPE OF

Sylvania

This article is not centrally concerned with the question
whether the Court in Sylvania was correct in overruling Schwinn.
Obviously I think the decision is good economics, and because it is
well settled that per se illegality is appropriate only when there are
grounds for confidence that a practice is on balance anticompetitive, good antitrust law as well. A more difficult question is whether
the Court should have followed the principle of stare decisis and
avoided overruling so recent a precedent. I can think of no compelling reason why. No doubt some firms relied on that part of the
Schwinn decision which allowed manufacturers to restrict distribution by means of consignment agreements, but Sylvania did not
disturb their reliance. The only people who relied to their detriment
on the per se rule laid down in Schwinn were the plaintiffs in
Sylvania-type cases.
More interesting and problematic than the merits of Sylvania
are the many questions regarding both substance and method in
antitrust law that the opinion raises. How many other antitrust
precedents must the Court in logic re-examine, having embraced, I
believe for the first time, the "free rider" concept?' 7 Will the Court's
strong endorsement of franchise distribution and, relatedly, of the
primacy of interbrand competition lead it to adopt more permissive
rules concerning other restrictions on intrabrand competition that
sellers impose on their franchised dealers and distributors? How far
is the Court prepared to press the suggestion in the Sylvania opinion
that economic considerations should be dominant in the decision of
antitrust cases? And what precisely is the Rule of Reason inquiry

See Telser, Advertising and Competition, 72 J. POL. ECON. 537 (1964).
' See 97 S. Ct. at 2561.
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envisaged by the Court in restricted distribution cases, now that
they have been removed from the per se category? These questions
are explored in the remainder of this article.
A.

Implications of the Free-Rider Concept

I said earlier that the reason why a manufacturer might want
to restrict competition in the distribution of his product is to evoke
the optimal level of dealer presale services. As the Court in Sylvania
noted, the restriction is necessary because in its absence any dealer
who offered presale services would be inviting competing dealers to
provide no (or fewer) services and thereby underprice him. This
"free-riding" danger would deter dealers from offering presale services, at least in the optimum amount.
The territorial system of the soft-drink companies, currently
under challenge by the FTC (which is, however, re-examining the
case in light of Sylvania), nicely illustrates the nature of the freerider problem.18 The Coca Cola Company considers it very important that Coke be available to the consuming public in vending
machines in bars, game rooms, athletic stadiums, and other locations where a sudden onset of thirst may induce the consumer to try,
and it is hoped like, Coke. The cost of distribution through thousands of scattered low-volume outlets is very high, however, and if
Cokes sold at these locations were priced to cover the full cost of
distribution, the price would be so high that Coca Cola's promotional objective would be defeated. Accordingly, each bottlerfranchisee is given an exclusive territory in order to encourage him
to maintain a below-cost price (that is, to "advertise" in the manner
found to be most effective in the soft-drink industry) in these outlets
and recoup his losses by charging a price well above cost in the
supermarkets, where the steady customer buys. This system of pricing could not be sustained if there were competition among bottlers,
for then some bottlers would do no promotional below-cost selling
but would instead cater only to the supermarket trade stimulated
by the bottlers who did. Stated otherwise, many bottlers would take
a free ride on the taste for the product created by the promotional
practices of the bottler who made Coke widely available at low
prices.
A more conventional example of the free-riding problem, closer
to Sylvania itself, is provided by the facts in United States v. Gen" See Coca Cola Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
(FTC, initial decision, Oct. 8, 1975).
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eral Motors Corp.,9 In the late 1950's, discount houses in Los Angeles
were offering new Chevrolets to the public at bargain prices. They
usually obtained these cars from Chevrolet dealers located across
town. A cooperating dealer, because he offered no presale services
in connection with the sale of the cars through discount houses,
could offer the discount house an attractive price, and the discount
house could get by with a small mark-up over that price because it
offered few presale services. Customers of the discount houses probably utilized the presale services provided by other dealers before
striking their bargains at the discount house. It is evident that if the
discount selling had become sufficiently widespread, Chevrolet
dealers would have become much less willing to offer presale services, at least without the awkward expedient of charging the potential customer for the service itself (for example, by levying an
entrance fee to the dealer showroom).
All this the Supreme Court in Sylvania was well aware of, but
it may not have been fully aware of the potential reach of the freerider concept. The Court must have realized, because Justice White
emphasized the point in his concurring opinion,"0 that the concept
applies with equal force to resale price maintenance. The Court
offered, however, two reasons for distinguishing resale price maintenance from nonprice restrictions in distribution.2 ' The first is that
resale price maintenance can be used to bolster collusion at the
manufacturer level: if colluding manufacturers have fixed the retail
as well as the wholesale price, then one of the manufacturers who
is cheating his fellows by undercutting the cartel price cannot pretend that his market share is increasing only because the retailers
who carry his product have decided, for their own reasons, to accept
a lower mark-up over the wholesale price of his product. But this
collusion-enhancing effect of resale price maintenance depends on
each retailer's handling only one manufacturer's brand of the product in question, which is the exceptional rather than the normal
resale price maintenance situation. The retailer who handles the
brands of several manufacturers will increase his purchases of, and
his sales efforts for, the brand of the manufacturer who offers him
the lowest wholesale price-the cartelist who is cheating. The presence of resale price maintenance will not make this type of cheating
any easier to detect.
Furthermore, exclusive territories or other nonprice restrictions
, 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
97 S. Ct. at 2567-68.
22 Id. at 2558-59 n.18.
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on dealer competition are also potential methods of shoring up a
manufacturers' cartel. They prevent a cheater from arguing that
any increase in his market share above the quota assigned him by
the cartel was due not to his price cutting but to competition among
his dealers. To be sure, nonprice restrictions would be effective in
shoring up cartels only in exclusive dealing situations, but, as we
saw, the effectiveness of resale price maintenance in shoring up
cartels is similarly limited. In short, the possible role of restricted
distribution in facilitating collusion at the manufacturer level does
22
not distinguish price from nonprice restrictions.
There is an even more fundamental objection to the Court's
attempted distinction between resale price maintenance and nonprice restrictions on dealer competition. That resale price maintenance might sometimes be used to bolster a cartel at the manufacturer level cannot, under accepted legal standards, justify making
the practice per se illegal. For example, under the test of Northern
Pacific, which the Court in Sylvania quoted and endorsed, only
arrangements which have a "pernicious effect on competition and
lack. . . any redeeming virtue"' are per se unlawful. The fact that
resale price maintenance might sometimes be used to bolster a cartel does not support the conclusion that it has a "pernicious effect
on competition," which implies something more than a mere possibility of abuse. As for the second prong of the NorthernPacific test,
the free-rider analysis, by which the Court found "redeeming virtue" in nonprice restrictions in distribution, applies equally to resale price maintenance. Telser originally developed the analysis to
explain resale price maintenance.
The second basis for distinguishing between price and nonprice
restrictions suggested by the Court in Sylvania was the recent repeal
of the fair-trade exemption to the Sherman and Federal Trade Commission Acts. 24 It is true that the legislative history reflects both a
rejection of the justifications that have been offered for resale price
maintenance and an awareness that the effect of repealing the exemption would be to throw it into the per se category. 2" However,
Congress's repeal of the fair trade exemption, even if motivated by
2 The approach to restricted distribution cases suggested below, see text and notes at
notes 50-54 infra, is not designed to ascertain when restrictions on distributors are employed
as an enforcement device by a manufacturers' cartel.
Id. at 2558 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)
(quoting Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958))).
21 See Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 3 (1975), 89 Stat. 801
(amending 15 U.S.C. 45(a) (1970)).
2 See H.R. REP. No. 94-341, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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dislike of resale price maintenance, was not a legislative decision to
place the per se rule beyond the power of courts to reexamine. That
issue was not put to Congress. Moreover, if the important thing is
not what Congress did, but the antitrust view that led to this result,
then since the policy considerations relative to resale price maintenance and nonprice restrictions are the same, the legislative history
argues for preservation of the per se rule of Schwinn.
To appreciate the fragility of the distinction between price and
nonprice restrictions in distribution, imagine that a few years from
now a case involving a manufacturer accused of illegal per se resale
price maintenance comes before the Supreme Court. This company
is just like Sylvania-a small, faltering competitor whose market
share rose after it adopted a restricted distribution system. The only
difference is that because of the nature of this company's product
(say, a pocket calculator) it is sold through numerous outlets located
very close to each other. It would be utterly impracticable for this
manufacturer to assign its dealers exclusive territories in order to
stimulate the provision of presale services (display or local advertising or whatever): the territories would be only a few blocks in extent
and policing adherence to territorial restrictions would therefore be
impossible. Suppose the defendant proved that, because of these
facts, it adopted resale price maintenance as the only feasible
method of procuring dealer presale services that were both necessary
and effective in enabling it to remain an effective competitor. How
could the Supreme Court condemn this use of resale price maintenance consistently with the analytical foundations of the Sylvania
opinion?
Dr. Miles is not the only precedent undermined by the freerider concept employed in Sylvania. In United States v. Sealy,
Inc., 6 decided the same day as Schwinn, the Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Fortas, held that an arrangement by which a
group of small mattress manufacturers parcelled out exclusive territorial rights to sell under a common trademark was a per se illegal
market division. The mattress manufacturers adopted this scheme
not in order to charge a monopoly price for mattresses; the aggregate
market share of the group, less than twenty percent, was too small
to make this a plausible objective and in any event the members
remained free to sell mattresses other than under the common
trademark. Almost certainly they did it, rather, to overcome the
21 388 U.S. 350 (1967). See also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
The Court in Sylvania distinguished Topco as involving a horizontal restraint. 97 S. Ct. at
2562 nn.27 -28. The significance of this distinction was not elaborated. Sealy was not cited.
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same kind of free-rider problem involved in restricted distribution
cases. Without exclusive territories, one member of the group could
take a free ride on the goodwill created by another member who
promoted the Sealy name in his territory. The prospect of freeriding would reduce the incentive of each member to promote the
Sealy name vigorously.
Another endangered precedent is Associated Press v. United
States,21 in which the Court held that the Associated Press could not
give its members veto power over the admission of new members.
The Associated Press is a joint venture of newspapers. The newspapers belonging to it pool the news and information gathered by each
member. In exchange for furnishing news to the pool, a member
(before the Supreme Court's decision) obtained the exclusive right
to distribute in its own market the news that other members furnished the pool. This system of exchange would be undermined if
each member did not possess an exclusive right to AP news in its
market-if, in other words, the association had to admit additional
members in areas where it already had a member. The incentive to
furnish the Associated Press with local news would be reduced if
competitors who made any effort to gather news could receive as of
right the news procured by industrious members.
B. More Endangered Precedents: Tie-in and Maximum-ResalePrice Cases
So far I have been discussing how the free-rider concept relied
on in the Sylvania opinion may force a re-examination of precedents
outside of the narrow area of nonprice restrictions on distribution.
But the Court in Sylvania may have been making a broader point
when it said:
Service and repair are vital for many products, such as automobiles and major household appliances. The availability and
quality of such services affect a manufacturer's goodwill and
the competitiveness of his product. Because of market imperfections such as the so-called "free rider" effect, these services might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive situation, despite the fact that each retailer's benefit
28
would be greater if all provided the services than if none did.
This language, plus repeated intimations in the opinion that interbrand competition is more important than intrabrand competi326 U.S. 1 (1945).
97 S. Ct. at 2561.
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tion,2 suggest a possible willingness to consider afresh the legality
of restrictions on competition in the distribution process which do
not prevent free-riding but which do enhance the manufacturer's
competitiveness.
Perhaps the time has come to reconsider the per se tie-in rule
as it has been applied to franchise distribution systems. As recently
as the second Fortner decision the Court held that a seller who
requires a buyer to take an unwanted second product as the condition of purchasing a product is guilty of an illegal per se tie-in, so
long as the seller has at least some "economic power" over the
desired product. The requirement of "economic power" is apparently satisfied by showing even a slight consumer preference for the
tying product over competing goods. The lower federal courts have
interpreted the tie-in rule as preventing franchisors from requiring
their franchisees to buy products as a condition of retaining the
franchise. For instance, Chicken Delight cannot require its franchisees to buy chickens from it; nor can Sinclair require its franchised
gasoline .dealers to buy tires, batteries, and other automobile accessories from it. 3 1 Yet it is difficult to believe that Chicken Delight or
Sinclair have more monopoly power than Schwinn or Sylvania. If
the latter are allowed to prevent their dealers from selling outside
assigned territories or to nonapproved outlets because they impose
these restrictions only in order to enhance their own competitiveness, why should not Chicken Delight or Sinclair be permitted to
restrict their dealers' purchasing freedom? These measures, too,
enhance the franchisor's ability to compete and hence increase interbrand competition, which according to Sylvania is "the primary
concern of antitrust law."3 A per se rule is no more appropriate for
this situation than for the particular distribution restrictions imposed by Schwinn and Sylvania.
Some tie-ins are imposed by monopolists as a method of price
discrimination, but tie-ins imposed by franchisors who are in competition with other sellers of the same product, just as Schwinn and
Sylvania are in competition with other sellers of bicycles and television sets, are not of this kind. Franchise tie-ins are methods not of
See id. at 2559 n.19, 2560-61.
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
3,See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
955 (1972); Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 963 (1961). Presumably, even under the most extreme view of the reach of the tie-in
rule, Sinclair may "tie" its gasoline to its franchise-it cannot be required to allow dealers
to sell some other gasoline company's gasoline under the Sinclair trademark.
1297 S. Ct. at 2559 n.19.
"
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discriminating or otherwise exploiting or extending monopoly power
but of promoting interbrand competition by assuring quality control
and product and service uniformity. This redeeming virtue should
be enough under the principles of Sylvania to remove the franchise
tie-in from the category of practices that are illegal per se.
It may be argued that the "goodwill defense" in tie-in law already protects the tie-in that promotes interbrand competition and
therefore that Sylvania should have no impact on the law of tie-ins.
However, the goodwill defense typically fails on the ground that the
defendant could have protected his goodwill by other, less restrictive means, such as by promulgating and enforcing detailed product
specifications.3 3 The basis of this approach-the notion that interbrand competition can be adequately protected by a per se rule
subject to a defense judged under the least-restrictive-alternative
standard-was, however, explicitly rejected by the Sylvania Court.
It noted: "The location restriction used by Sylvania was neither the
least nor the most restrictive provision that it could have used. But
we agree with the implicit judgment in Schwinn that a per se rule
based on the nature of the restriction is, in general, undesirable. 31 4
Still another precedent threatened by Sylvania is Albrecht v.
Herald Co. 35 The Court in Albrecht held that it was per se unlawful
for a newspaper publisher to place a ceiling on the price at which
its retail distributors could sell its newspaper to the consumer. Because the publisher had assigned the distributors exclusive territories, the most likely reason for the price ceiling was to prevent the
distributor from using his distribution monopoly for his benefit
rather than the publisher's. The logic of Sylvania is that restrictions
imposed on dealers by manufacturers promote interbrand competition and are therefore not per se illegal, save perhaps if the manufacturer has a monopoly. That logic demolishes Albrecht.
C.

The New Importance of Economics

Wholly apart from the Court's kind words for franchise restrictions and its adoption of the free-rider concept, certain language in
the opinion concerning the use of economics to guide antitrust analysis can be expected to reverberate throughout the lower federal
courts. The Court said that "competitive economies have social and

"

See, e.g., International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
Under the per se tie-in rule, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the tie-in was
necessary to protect his goodwill. Id. at 138-39.
97 S. Ct. at 2562 n.29.
390 U.S. 145 (1968).

HeinOnline -- 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 12 1977-1978

Reflections on Sylvania

19771

political as well as economic advantages, but an antitrust policy
divorced from market considerations would lack any objective
benchmarks,"3 and that any "departure from the rule of reason
standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect. '37 One
must not read a Supreme Court opinion like a bond indenture, but
it does appear that the Court is implying that antitrust prohibitions
must have an economic rationale and that the aesthetic delights of
smallness and the yearning to resurrect a nation of sturdy Jeffersonian yeomen will not be permitted to decide antitrust cases. This
impression is reinforced by the frequency of the Court's citations to
the writings of members of the "Chicago School," like Bork and me,
who argue that economic efficiency is the only goal of antitrust law. 8
Most of the antitrust rules limiting "vertical" restrictions (a
restriction imposed up or down the chain of production and distribution, rather than between competitors) lack an economic basis,
or, more precisely, have no stronger economic basis than Schwinn's
per se prohibition of nonprice restrictions in distribution. In fact,
the Court in Sylvania intimated that all per se proscriptions of
vertical restraints, mysteriously excepting the rule against resale
price maintenance which it tepidly endorsed, are due for reexamination. The Court stated: "[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that particular applications of vertical restrictions might justify per se prohibition,"" suggesting that it is prepared to reconsider
all such prohibitions de novo, using the newly accepted economic
approach.4 1 Tie-ins (not only in franchising), reciprocal buying, exclusive dealing, vertical mergers involving large market shares, boycotts-practices and transactions heretofore regarded as per se illegal or nearly so-may receive a more sympathetic judicial response
in the wake of Sylvania.
D.

The Rule of Reason in Restricted Distribution Cases

1. What Is the Rule of Reason? The Court in Sylvania did not
hold that restrictions on competition at the distribution level are
legal; it held only that such restrictions are to be tested under the
Rule of Reason rather than automatically condemned. The Court
97 S. Ct. at 2559-60 n.21.
Id. at 2562.
See, e.g., id. at 2561.
' See

R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 171-211 (1976).
97 S. Ct. at 2562.
, Read in context, "vertical restrictions" may refer only to nonprice restrictions in distribution. Or perhaps the Court was momentarily inattentive to the host of other vertical
restrictions that the courts have held to be per se violations of the antitrust laws.
"
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did not, however, describe the Rule of Reason test. The opinion
speaks as though the Rule of Reason were the normal standard for
deciding antitrust cases and the per se concept the exception. The
Court called the Rule of Reason the "prevailing standard of analysis''42 and implied that prior to Schwinn the standard was used
many times in restricted distribution cases. Were this true, there
would be no need to specify the meaning of the Rule of Reason as
applied to restricted distribution. It is not true.
The Rule of Reason is rarely used to decide cases. Agreements
among competitors are ordinarily condemned outright under the per
se rule forbidding price fixing or its equivalents. Mergers are governed by reasonably specific rules evolved in decisions construing
section 7 of the Clayton Act. Vertical restrictions other than mergers
are governed by per se rules (for example, tie-ins), by rules developed in decisions interpreting section 3 of the Clayton Act (requirements contracts, for instance), or by rules developed in monopolization cases under section 2 of the Sherman Act. The reader is invited
to compile a list of cases of which it may fairly be said that the Rule
of Reason was the determinative legal standard. The list will be a
short one.
The content of the Rule of Reason is largely unknown; in practice, it is little more than a euphemism for nonliability. Before
Schwinn, restrictions on distribution were tested under the Rule of
Reason, meaning: they were lawful. The Court in Sylvania may not
have intended by its invocation of the Rule of Reason to bless all
restrictions in distribution, but it was deceived if it thought it was
subjecting those restrictions to scrutiny under a well-understood
legal standard.
The Court's only effort to provide some content to the Rule of
Reason was to quote from Justice Brandeis's opinion in Chicago
Board of Trade:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates arid perhaps thereby promotes competition
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint
is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
,297 S. Ct. at 2557.
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sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because
a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation
or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the
court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.43
This is not a helpful formulation. To be told to look to the history,
circumstances, purposes, and effects of a challenged restriction is
not to be provided with usable criteria of illegality. If Justice Brandeis had said that the test was whether the restriction was on balance pro- or anti-competitive, this would at least have excluded
criteria unrelated to competitiveness. Perhaps that is the meaning
of the first sentence quoted above. Yet arguably competition should
not be the exclusive determinant of an unreasonable restraint of
trade. This formulation would prohibit those restraints that, while
reducing competition, on balance increase efficiency. For example,
it would bar a merger that gave the acquiring firm a monopoly but,
in so doing, reduced the costs of serving the market to such an
extent that the monopoly price after the merger was lower than the
competitive market price had been before it.
Other formulations of the Rule of Reason are no more instructive. Illustrative is the formulation in Columbia Steel:
In determining what constitutes unreasonable restraint, we do
not think the dollar volume is in itself of compelling significance; we look rather to the percentage of business controlled,
the strength of the remaining competition, whether the action
springs from business requirements or purpose to monopolize,
the probable development of the industry, consumer demands,
and other characteristics of the market. We do not undertake
to prescribe any set of percentage figures. .

.

.The relative

effect of percentage command of a market varies with the setting in which that factor is placed."
Developed to guide the decision of merger cases, the ColumbiaSteel
standard was quickly superseded in its original context by enactment of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act in 1950.11 It was, however, later applied in the Times-Picayune case" to determine the
reasonableness of a newspaper publisher's requirement that advertisers buy space in both the morning and evening editions. But
4 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918),
quoted in 97 S. Ct.
at 2557-58 n.15.
" United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527-28 (1948).
Act of Dec. 29, 1950, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970)).
" Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614-26 (1953).
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Times-Picayune is one of the very few Supreme Court cases in modern times in which the Rule of Reason was the rule of decision.
The Rule of Reason in its present state is a poor guide to the
decision of restricted distribution cases. Its formlessness is clearly
conveyed by the American Bar Association's recent monograph on
restricted distribution." This sixteen-page discussion of how the
Rule of Reason might be applied to restricted distribution cases
invites the courts to consider whether the restraint is ancillary to a
legitimate business purpose or anticompetitive in purpose; if the
former, whether the restriction is reasonably necessary to accomplish the legitimate business purpose-and to this question "[t]he
degree of consumer acceptance of the product, the physical characteristics of the product and any unique marketing problems involved, the duration and scope of the intrabrand restraint, the
strength of interbrand competition, and the acceptability of less
restrictive alternatives might all be relevant" ;48 whether the defendant has market power, as determined by a study of market share,
entry, and potential interbrand competition; the degree of product
differentiation; a host of potentially exculpatory factors including
the defendant's interests in maximizing market penetration, stimulating distributor service and other activity, and obtaining a market
presence; and, finally, the effect of the challenged restriction on the
survival of small business.
A start toward making the Rule of Reason more manageable is
to adopt Professor Bork's position that the essential spirit of the
Rule is to condemn only those practices that are, on balance, inefficient in the economic sense. 9 This would exclude some of the factors
listed in the standard formulation of the Rule of Reason. But without further particularization Bork's efficiency standard is insufficiently precise to guide the decision of restricted distribution
cases.
2. Making the Rule of Reason Operational. There are at
least two approaches to making the Rule of Reason a usable standard in cases involving restrictions on distribution. The first, loosely
suggested by the Chicago Board of Trade formulation, is to require
the trier of fact to balance the reduction in intrabrand competition
against the increase in interbrand competition attributable to the
restriction. To illustrate, the judge or jury would try to figure out
how much money or welfare Sylvania's customers lost because its
See ABA

ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 10, at 55-71.
Id. at 57.
' Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: PriceFixing and Market Division,
pt. 1), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
'7
"
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dealers were not able to compete with each other and how much
they gained because the location clause increased the presale services provided by the dealers. Besides requiring a trial of unmanageable complexity to quantify these impacts, this approach calls
for an inquiry that is often unnecessary. Since Sylvania is not a
monopolist, it would not knowingly impose a restriction on dealer
competition that made the consumer of Sylvania products a net
loser-that could only reduce Sylvania's sales and profits. Under
this kind of balancing approach, the Rule of Reason would be used
not only to prevent abuses of market power but to correct the mistakes of the powerless.
The second, and in my opinion vastly superior, approach is to
focus on the single question whether the restriction is intended to
cartelize distribution or, on the contrary, to promote the manufacturer's own interests. The goal is to isolate, and condemn, restrictions that are imposed nominally by the manufacturer but are in
fact desired for monopolistic purposes by dealers using the manufacturer as their enforcement agent.
Under this test, many cases would be dismissed simply on a
showing that the dealers' share of the relevant market was too small
to give them the power to collude effectively. If American Motors
has two percent of the U.S. automobile market and its dealers sell
only American Motors cars, it is inconceivable that the purpose of
giving American Motors dealers exclusive territories is to cartelize
the distribution of automobiles. While it is true that, in principle,
some (very few) consumers may so prefer American Motors to competing brands of automobiles that the dealers in those cars face as
a group a downward-sloping demand curve, the slope is too close to
being horizontal for courts to worry about dealer collusion."
The suggested approach would automatically preclude liability
unless the manufacturer had a very large market share or unless all
or most of the manufacturers in the market imposed uniform restrictions on their dealers so that (in either case) the dealers had a
monopoly position in a genuine economic market. Where these conditions are satisfied, however, it may be quite difficult to determine
whether the restriction is evidence of a dealers' cartel or of the
manufacturer's wish to stimulate the provision of presale services.
If no presale services (local advertising, display, and so forth) are
My suggested emphasis on market shares is consistent with the importance attached
to them in the early price-fixing cases, such as United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), before the per se rule against
price fixing crystallized.
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in fact provided, this is strong evidence of cartelization. But even if
extensive presale services are provided, that would not be conclusive
evidence against cartelization; individual dealers might be stepping
up service competition in order to capture as much of the profits
generated by their cartel as possible.51
Where services are provided by dealers who dominate a relevant market, a possible way to distinguish a dealer cartel from a
restriction that serves the manufacturer's interests is suggested by
the fact that in the former situation limitations on dealer competition should reduce the output of the product in question while in
the latter case output should increase. The object of the dealers'
cartel is to raise the price of the good above its previous (competitive) level. If this goal is attained, the amount of the good demanded, and hence supplied, will fall (although sales may later rise
as individual dealers add services in order to increase their sales at
the higher price and in so doing shift their demand curve to the
right). The manufacturer, in contrast, limits competition among his
dealers in order to increase the value of and thus the demand for
his product; and generally, although not invariably, a higher demand and hence a greater output will result from his effort. In
Sylvania the defendant's market share increased after the imposition of the restriction (in Schwinn it fell), but it would take careful
analysis, perhaps utilizing econometric methods, to determine
whether the restriction was the cause of Sylvania's gain in sales or
whether its sales would have increased even more without it. I would
place on the government the burden of overcoming the inference
created by Sylvania's sales gain that the location clause was in fact
imposed for the manufacturer's benefit.
The Court in Sylvania considered Sylvania's increased sales
revenues to be evidence that the challenged restriction was employed for Sylvania's benefit.5 2 The appropriate output measure,
however, is physical quantity rather than revenue. Monopoly reduces physical output; sales revenues may or may not be greater
(profits will of course be greater, at least in the short run). By
51The reader may wonder what difference it makes whether dealers engage in service
competition because they are trying to maximize their share of a dealer cartel's profits or
because the manufacturer restricts price competition; in either case the service competition
and the resulting higher level of services provided consumers result from the elimination of
price competition. The difference is that the manufacturer, acting voluntarily, will restrict
dealer competition only to the extent necessary to evoke the optimal level of presale services.
A dealer cartel might restrict dealer price competition much more, resulting in an excessive
level of services and a net reduction in consumer welfare; or the dealer cartel might attempt
to suppress service as well as price competition.
51 97 S. Ct. at 2552.
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reducing demand for the product sold by the dealers, a dealer cartel
will also reduce the dealers' demand from the manufacturer, causing his output to fall. Probably his revenues will also fall, because
he does not benefit from the increase in the retail price brought
about by the dealers' cartel. However, his revenues might rise were
the dealers compensating him, in the form of a higher wholesale
price, for acting as the cartel's policeman.
To summarize, I suggest a three-stage inquiry for determining
the legality of restricted distribution, now that the inappropriate
per se rule of illegality has been discarded (as should be clear, I
would use this inquiry whether the restriction is price or nonprice
in character):
1. Does the restriction embrace so large a fraction of the market as to make cartelization a plausible motivation for the
restriction? If not, the restriction should be held lawful.
2. If the restriction does embrace a sufficiently large fraction
of the market to make cartelization a possible motivation, do dealers in the product in question provide any presale services? If not,
the restriction should be deemed unlawful. (An alternative would
shift the burden of justification to the defendant at this point).
3. If the answer to both of the previous questions is yes (large
market share and presale services provided), did the manufacturer's
output increase or decrease after imposing the restriction? If his
output increased, the burden would shift to the government of showing that it increased for reasons unrelated to the restriction. If output fell after imposition of the restriction, the restriction would be
deemed unlawful, unless perhaps the defendant could prove that he
intended by adopting the restriction to increase his output.
The suggested guide may appear to overlook a much simpler
method of determining the nature of the restriction, namely, by
ascertaing whether it was imposed by the manufacturer or by the
dealers. But this approach is unsound (and not really simple). Dealers as well as the manufacturer are hurt by free-riding; it is a detail
whether the initiative in seeking to prevent free-riding was taken by
the dealers or the manufacturer. This point was missed in Justice
53
Fortas's opinion for the Court in the General Motors dealers case.
The government briefed the case on the assumption that the main
issue was the lawfulness of General Motors' location clause. The
Court, demonstrating the same obsession with form at the expense
of substance evinced in Schwinn and Sealy, ruled that because com-

m United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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peting dealers had collaborated to enlist General Motors' assistance
in enforcing the location clause, the case involved an illegal per se
horizontal conspiracy, regardless of the reasonableness of the clause.
But if the clause was reasonable, the dealers should have been entitled to band together for the innocent purpose of persuading General
Motors to carry out mutually beneficial contractual obligations.
Thus I disagree with Professor Bork's contention that detection of a dealer cartel is easy because of the large numbers of dealers
who must join the cartel to make it effective. 4 It may be easy to
detect cooperative activity among the dealers but it is difficult to
determine whether the purpose of the activity is to cartelize retail
distribution or to overcome a genuine free-rider problem. The
three-stage inquiry outlined above may be the simpler method of
deciding this question after all.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's Sylvania decision gives new prominence
to the economic approach to antitrust law. Pursued to its logical
conclusion, that approach requires the Court to reexamine a variety
of other practices besides the nonprice distribution restrictions that
were the subject of the opinion. But it must be admitted that economic science is more serviceable for deciding which practices
should and which practices should not be classified as per se illegal
restraints of trade than for guiding the trial of cases in which per se
rules have been held inapplicable. Determining whether a challenged restriction on distribution is really a device for overcoming
free-rider problems and hence increasing competition or whether it
is a method of dealer cartelization is a formidable task. I have suggested a possible approach to this problem. Many hard questions
remain unanswered, such as whether the three-stage approach
should be used as the standard for adjudging criminal liability and,
if not, how a criminal conspiracy among dealers to restrain trade
could ever be proved, consistently with sound economic principles.
It remains to be seen whether the law can develop rules for restricted
distribution cases that will be at once effective and economically
sound.
5 Bork,

Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 171, 190-91.
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